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The Honorable Frederick W. Fleming

Hearing Date: November 16, 2011

Hearing Time: 1:30 p.m.

Hearing Location: Pierce County Superior Court

STATE OF WASHINGTON  
PIERCE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

AMBER WRIGHT,

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF WASHINGTON,  
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND  
HEALTH SERVICES,

Defendant.

NO. 10-2-08114-9

DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO  
PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR  
STATUTORY PENALTIES,  
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

I. INTRODUCTION

On September 1, 2011, this Court found that Defendant, Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS), withheld three records in violation of the Public Records Act (PRA) and is entitled to penalties and costs under the PRA. All three of these records were provided to Plaintiff prior to this PRA lawsuit. In fact, this PRA lawsuit has not caused a single additional record to be produced to the requester. Yet, Plaintiff is now seeking the incredibly inflated sum of \$636,396.87 for penalties and costs. These enormous amounts are not supported by law and are inconsistent with other PRA judicial determinations.

With regard to the daily penalty, this Court is not required to apply a separate daily penalty to each individual record that was found to be improperly withheld. Plaintiff is asking

1 this Court to award the \$100 daily maximum penalty for the audio recording, and she then asks  
2 this Court to double that daily penalty for the recorded statement to \$200 per day for the period  
3 it was withheld from both of her requests. She is also requesting an additional \$100 per day  
4 for each of the two other records. This amounts to a request for \$400 per day for many of the  
5 days in Plaintiff's requested penalty calculation.

6 This Court should instead analyze and apply the *Yousoufian* aggravating and mitigating  
7 factors and determine a reasonable single daily penalty within the statutory penalty range. We  
8 are asking this Court to impose a daily penalty between zero and \$30 per day based on the facts  
9 of this case. Again, DSHS has never claimed that the three records were exempt from  
10 disclosure to Plaintiff. The recorded statement was provided as soon as DSHS discovered it  
11 was not originally provided, which was months before this lawsuit was filed. The two other  
12 records were provided in discovery in her torts case, and DSHS did not identify them as  
13 responsive to the requests for public records. This conduct does not amount to bad faith, and a  
14 daily penalty should be at the low end of the penalty range and is nowhere near the daily \$100  
15 maximum penalty.

16 With regard to attorney fees, Plaintiff is requesting 378.6 hours for four attorneys and  
17 48.25 hours for a paralegal, and they want up to \$500 per hour for the attorney work.  
18 Plaintiff's petition fails to provide an accounting for a single hour of the work performed. This  
19 Court's decisions on PRA liability in this case involved a summary judgment hearing on  
20 April 29, 2011, and less than a day and a half of trial that started on August 31, 2011.  
21 Claiming 426.85 hours for "reasonable" fees in this case is extremely excessive, and even more  
22 outrageous is the request in Plaintiff's petition to double their attorney fees with a Lodestar  
23 multiplier to \$332,500 in fees.

24 This Court should deny Plaintiff's request for attorney fees because she failed to  
25 account for her 426.85 hours in fees. DSHS is entitled to an opportunity to review and respond  
26

1 to an accounting so that the Court can then conduct a Lodestar analysis to determine  
2 reasonable attorney fees.

## 3 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

4 Plaintiff, through her attorneys, made written requests for records on March 26, 2007,  
5 and on May 20, 2008.

6 Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on April 6, 2010, claiming violations of the Public Records  
7 Act (PRA). A trial lasting a day and a half took place on August 31, 2011. This Court ruled  
8 that DSHS violated the PRA by withholding the following three records:

- 9 1. An audio recording and transcript (hereafter "audio recording") provided on  
10 December 11, 2009.
- 11 2. A DSHS foster care/adoption manual (hereafter "PRIDE manual") provided on  
12 March 4, 2010.
- 13 3. The Child Physical and Sexual Abuse Investigation Protocols for Pierce  
14 County, Washington (hereafter "Investigation Protocols") provided on March 16,  
15 2010.

16 This Court also ruled that DSHS violated the PRA by not listing these "withheld"  
17 records on an exemption log. *See* Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law. As discussed in  
18 detail in the argument below, only one record, an audio recording, was inadvertently missed  
19 when producing approximately 5,600 pages to Plaintiff from her DSHS child welfare file.  
20 When the error was discovered, this missed record was promptly produced on December 11,  
21 2009. *See* Trial Exhibit 215. The PRIDE Manual and Investigation Protocols documents were  
22 produced in discovery in Plaintiff's tort lawsuit in federal court and were never produced in  
23 response to her public record requests. *See* Trial Exhibits 5 and 6.

24 This Court did not find any other violations of the PRA with regard to the other roughly  
25 5,600 pages of records that were produced in response to Plaintiff's requests for records. This  
26 Court declined the request by DSHS to treat the audio recording from Plaintiff's child welfare

1 file as being governed exclusively by RCW 13.50.100 instead of the PRA. This Court did not  
2 explain why the audio recording is not governed by RCW 13.50.100, and DSHS renews its  
3 request to apply no penalty to this record under the substantial authority provided in summary  
4 judgment argument and in Defendant's trial brief.

5 All three records in question were provided to Plaintiff prior to this case being filed,  
6 and this lawsuit has not caused a single withheld record to be produced to Plaintiff. Yet,  
7 Plaintiff now seeks the incredible sum of \$636,396.87 in penalties, attorney fees, and costs.

### 8 III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES

- 9 1. Instead of defaulting to the \$100 per day maximum penalty, should this Court also  
10 consider mitigating factors and apply a penalty that is more appropriately in the  
11 zero to \$15 per day range?
- 12 2. Should this Court deny Plaintiff's request for attorney fees and costs, which  
13 include 426.85 hours of legal work for four attorneys at up to \$500 per hour, when  
14 Plaintiff has failed to provide adequate information for this Court to conduct an  
independent determination of fees and costs using the Lodestar method?

### 14 IV. ARGUMENT

#### 15 A. **Instead Of Defaulting To The Maximum Penalty Of \$100 Per Day For Each Of 16 The Three Records, This Court Should Consider Mitigating Factors And Apply A Penalty Of Zero To \$15 Dollars Per Day To Two Categories Of Records**

##### 17 1. **The General PRA Penalty Scheme**

18 The penalty provision in the PRA is in RCW 42.56.550(4), which provides that in  
19 addition to being awarded costs and attorney fees, "it shall be within the discretion of the court  
20 to award such person an amount not to exceed one hundred dollars for each day that he or she  
21 was denied the right to inspect or copy said public record."

22 The process for determining the appropriate PRA award is best described as requiring  
23 two steps: (1) determine the amount of days the party was denied access and (2) determine the  
24 appropriate per day penalty within the penalty range depending on the agency's actions. *See*  
25 *Yousoufian v. Office of Ron Sims*, 152 Wn.2d 421, 438, 98 P.3d 463 (2004) (*Yousoufian I*). A  
26 per-record penalty is not required, and penalties can be determined on a per-request basis.

1 *Zink v. City of Mesa* 140 Wn. App. 328, 348, 166 P.3d 738 (2007) (trial court directed to  
2 impose statutory penalties on a per-day, per-request basis).

3       **2. Number Of Records – Applying A Separate Daily Penalty To Each**  
4       **Separate Record Withheld Is Not Required Under The PRA**

5       In *Yousoufian I*, the Washington Supreme Court held that trial courts are not required to  
6 award a daily penalty for each record that was requested but not produced. *Yousoufian I*,  
7 152 Wn.2d at 435-36. In that case, the county argued that a “per record” penalty would lead to  
8 absurd results. *Id.* at 431. Specifically, it sensibly asserted—and the court agreed—that  
9 “[u]nder *Yousoufian*’s interpretation, agencies that acted in good faith but failed to respond  
10 adequately to broad requests for multiple documents would often pay higher penalties than  
11 agencies that refused to disclose a single document in bad faith.” *Id.* at 435. That court held:

12       **Although the PDAs purpose is to promote access to public records, this**  
13       **purpose is better served by increasing the penalty based on an agency's**  
14       **culpability than it is by basing the penalty on the size of the plaintiffs [sic]**  
15       **request. . . . Therefore, based on the ambiguity of the statute and the purpose for**  
16       **enacting the [PRA], we conclude that RCW [42.56.550(4)] does not require the**  
17       **assessment of per day penalties for each requested record.**

18       *Id.* at 435-436 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). We are not aware of any Washington  
19 appellate court that has ever approved a strict “per record” penalty. The Washington Supreme  
20 Court more recently again applied the reasoning in *Yousoufian I* and confirmed a per-record  
21 penalty is not required. *Sanders v. State*, 169 Wn.2d 827, 864, 240 P.3d 120 (2010). The court  
22 explained “the trial court interpreted the PRA request as seeking two records, **as grouped**  
23 **broadly by subject matter**. This is consistent with the discretion we elucidated in *Yousoufian*  
24 *I.*” *Id.* at 864 (emphasis added). With regard to four documents that were improperly withheld  
25 in that case, the court explained:

26       These four wrongfully withheld documents all relate to the same topic, screening  
procedures at AGO during Justice Sanders's CJC proceeding, and **were produced**  
**at roughly the same time**. Consistent with our affirmance of the trial court's  
grouping of the other documents in this case, we consider these four documents a  
single “record.”

1 *Id.* at 864-865 (emphasis added).

2 This Court found that three records were improperly withheld under the PRA. The first  
3 record is the audio recording, and Plaintiff is asking this Court to apply two \$100 per day  
4 penalties to this record because the record is responsive to both the 2007 and 2008 requests.  
5 There is no legal authority to apply two separate penalties to one record that was withheld from  
6 a single plaintiff. This Court must apply a single penalty to the audio recording. To hold  
7 otherwise will lead to absurd results such as requesters asking for the same records multiple  
8 times to gain larger penalties.

9 Plaintiff is seeking a separate penalty for the PRIDE Manual and Investigation  
10 Protocols document in relation to her May 20, 2008 request for records. Following the trial in  
11 this case, this Court did not explain what language in Plaintiff's request specifically asked for  
12 the PRIDE Manual and Investigation Protocols documents. However, the Court did indicate  
13 during the trial that it believed these documents were responsive to the requests under a broad  
14 "discovery" standard that entitles a person to all documents that could relate to their potential  
15 claims against an agency. Both of these records were provided to Plaintiff in March 2010 in  
16 the discovery phase of her torts case in federal court. *See* Trial Exs. 5 and 6. Pursuant to  
17 *Yousoufian I* and *Sanders*, the PRIDE Manual and Investigation Protocols documents should  
18 be treated as one "record" because they are both within the same broad group and produced at  
19 roughly the same time.

20 **3. Number Of Penalty Days – This Court Must Calculate The Actual Number**  
21 **Of Days Plaintiff Was Denied The Right To Inspect Or Copy The Records**

22 The determination of the number of penalty days is a question of fact. *Yousoufian I*,  
23 152 Wn.2d at 439. PRA penalties are awarded "for each day that [the plaintiff] was denied the  
24 right to inspect or copy said public record." *Id.* at 437. The date Plaintiff received the three  
25 records is not in dispute. However, Plaintiff asks this Court to start the penalty period from the  
26 date of the record requests, which is incorrect.

1        Nothing in the penalty provision in RCW 42.56.550(4) requires the penalty period to  
2 begin on the day of the request; the Court must instead determine the number of days Plaintiff  
3 was denied the records. Under RCW 42.56.520, an agency must respond to a public records  
4 request within five days and is permitted to respond by confirming it "has received the request  
5 and providing a reasonable estimate of the time the agency . . . will require to respond to the  
6 request." Also, "[a]dditional time required to respond to a request may be based upon the need  
7 to clarify the intent of the request" and "to locate and assemble the information requested."  
8 RCW 42.56.550. Thus, the penalty period in this case should begin when the three withheld  
9 records properly should have been provided to Plaintiff, which is when DSHS estimated it  
10 would complete the response or actually timely completed the response.

11        With regard to the request on March 26, 2007, DSHS timely responded to attorney  
12 Carter Hick by seeking clarification of what records were being requested and securing a  
13 signed authorization. *See* Trial Exs. 201, 202, 203. On May 8, 2007, DSHS estimated the  
14 records would be provided within 30 days, and the records were timely provided on June 1,  
15 2007. *See* Trial Exs. 205 and 206. This response time did not violate the PRA. *See* Findings  
16 of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The missed audio recording was provided on December 11,  
17 2009, and has a penalty period of 924 days from June 1, 2007.

18        With regard to the request on May 20, 2008, DSHS timely responded on May 28, 2008,  
19 estimating the response would take up to 120 business days, and DSHS complied with that  
20 estimate by providing the final installment of records on November 14, 2008. *See* Trial Exs.  
21 206, 207, 211, 212, 213, and 214. This response time did not violate the PRA. *See* Findings of  
22 Fact and Conclusions of Law. DSHS provided the PRIDE Manual and Investigation Protocols  
23 documents in discovery in the torts lawsuit on March 4, 2010, and March 16, 2010,  
24 respectively. Therefore, the correct penalty days are 475 days for the PRIDE Manual and 487  
25 days for the Investigation Protocols document. Because these two documents should be treated  
26

1 as one "record" for penalty assessment, the longer period of 487 days should be used for this  
2 category of records.<sup>1</sup>

3 **4. Daily Penalty – The Daily Penalty For The Records Withheld Should Be At**  
4 **The Very Low End Of The Penalty Range Based On The *Yousoufian***  
5 **Factors**

6 The determination of the appropriate per day penalty is within the discretion of the trial  
7 court. *Yousoufian*, 152 Wn.2d at 439. Trial courts may exercise their considerable discretion  
8 under the PRA's penalty provisions in deciding where to begin a penalty determination.  
9 *Yousoufian v. Office of Ron Sims*, 168 Wn.2d 444, 466-467, 229 P.3d 735 (2010).  
10 "[D]epending upon the circumstances of a case, it may be within a trial court's discretion to  
11 begin a penalty determination at the minimum daily penalty amount of \$5." *Yousoufian*, 168  
12 Wn.2d at 467 n.9.

13 Effective July 22, 2011, RCW 42.56.550(4) was modified to eliminate the five-dollars-  
14 per-day minimum penalty for PRA violations and provide courts with discretion to award less  
15 than five dollars per day or no penalty at all. See Laws of 2011, ch. 273, § 1. By definition,  
16 this amendment is remedial in nature, as it revises the remedy a court may award for certain  
17 violations of the PRA and does not affect a substantive or vested right. *1000 Virginia v.*  
18 *Vertecs*, 158 Wn.2d 566, 586, 146 P.3d 423 (2006); *Marine Power & Equip. v. Human Rights*  
19 *Comm'n*, 39 Wn. App. 609, 617, 694 P.2d 697 (1985).

20 A remedial statute applies retroactively. *Ballard Square Ass'n Condo. Owners v.*  
21 *Dynasty Constr.*, 158 Wn.2d 603, 617, 146 P.3d 914 (2006). Retroactive application is  
22 appropriate even after a lawsuit is filed and the case is on appeal. When a controlling law  
23 changes between the entering of judgment below and consideration of the matter on appeal, the  
24 appellate court should apply the new or altered law. *Marine Power*, 39 Wn. App. at 620; see  
25 also *West v. Thurston Cnty.*, 144 Wn. App. 573, 583-84, 183 P.3d 346 (2008) (applying

26 <sup>1</sup> Defendant's proposed penalty calculations are summarized in Appendix A to this response.



1 amendment to PRA enacted while case was on appeal, i.e., PRA's applicability to public funds  
2 expended by private legal counsel).

3 The Washington Supreme Court has set forth sixteen mitigating and aggravating factors  
4 that a trial court may consider when determining a daily PRA penalty. *Yousoufian*, 168 Wn.2d  
5 at 467-68. A strict and singular emphasis on good faith or bad faith is inadequate to fully  
6 consider a PRA penalty determination. *Id.* at 461. "[T]he factors may overlap, are offered  
7 only as guidance, may not apply equally or at all in every case, and are not an exclusive list of  
8 appropriate considerations." *Id.* at 468. Plaintiff wrongly claims "DSHS failed to offer **any**  
9 evidence showing that the "mitigating" factors described in *Yousoufian* apply." Pls. Pet. at 8  
10 (emphasis in original). Their position ignores much of the undisputed evidence at trial and the  
11 following *Yousoufian* guidance:

12 In our view, mitigating factors that may serve to decrease the penalty are (1) a  
13 lack of clarity in the PRA request, (2) the agency's prompt response or legitimate  
14 follow-up inquiry for clarification, (3) the agency's good faith, honest, timely, and  
15 strict compliance with all PRA procedural requirements and exceptions, (4)  
16 proper training and supervision of the agency's personnel, (5) the reasonableness  
of any explanation for noncompliance by the agency, (6) the helpfulness of the  
agency to the requestor, and (7) the existence of agency systems to track and  
retrieve public records.

17  
18 *Yousoufian*, 168 Wn.2d at 467. Accordingly, consideration of the following relevant  
19 *Yousoufian* factors strongly favors a low daily penalty award:

20 Lack of Clarity in the Request: The 2008 request did not expressly request the PRIDE  
21 Manual or the Investigation Protocols document, and it did not clearly identify a class of  
22 records that includes these two documents. See Trial Exhibit 206. This should reduce the  
23 penalty related to those documents.

24 Prompt Initial Response: It is undisputed that DSHS timely responded within five days  
25 to both the 2007 and 2008 requests for records, helpfully acknowledged the requests and  
26 provided an estimate of time for responding, and then provided their responses within the time

1 estimates. *See* Trial Exhibits 202, 204, 207, 210-214. Because DSHS met its duty under  
2 RCW 42.56.520 to provide a prompt initial response, the daily penalty award should be  
3 mitigated.

4 Good Faith, Honest Processing of the Request and Strict Compliance with PRA: All of  
5 the communications from DSHS to the requester in this case demonstrate good faith, courtesy,  
6 professionalism, and an effort to be helpful and properly fulfill the requests for records. *See*  
7 Trial Exs. 202, 204, 205, 207, 210-215. DSHS timely responded to every concern raised by  
8 the requester, and explained in detail how the requests for records were being processed.  
9 DSHS complied with the five day response requirement and produced records with the  
10 estimated times. DSHS also properly made redactions and claimed exemption in the roughly  
11 3,400 pages of child welfare records.

12 When DSHS processed Amber Wright's child welfare file consisting of thousands of  
13 pages of records, this Court found that only one record was missed from the enormous file.  
14 Upon learning about that missed audio recording in early December 2009, DSHS promptly  
15 provided it on December 11, 2009. McPherson Declaration In Support of Department's  
16 Response (McPherson Decl.) ¶ 8, Ex. D.

17 There was not an attempt to hide the existence of the interview. Rather, there were  
18 multiple pages in the first installment of records provided to the requester that made mention of  
19 the recorded interview, including a form called Children's Administration Audio Recording  
20 Tracking, which is a standard form used for audio-recorded child interviews. McPherson Decl.  
21 ¶ 10. Also, the requester herself, Amber Wright, would know at every stage that she had given  
22 a recorded interview. The goal of DSHS is to provide all responsive records, and their  
23 disclosure staff understands that in a case such as this one, a separate tort lawsuit will often  
24 involve civil discovery requests for the very same records. McPherson Decl. ¶ 11. Thus,  
25 purposely withholding the recorded interview in this case and then later producing it would not  
26 only violate DSHS disclosure policies, it would be irrational. While a disappeared or

1 destroyed audio recording might raise some questions, this recording was quickly found and  
2 provided upon discovering the inadvertent error.

3 The PRIDE Manual and Investigation Protocols documents also involve good faith.  
4 DSHS did not find language in the 2008 request that could reasonably be viewed as asking for  
5 these two documents. *See* McPherson Decl. ¶ 18. These two documents are not records in  
6 Amber Wright's child welfare files, and they do not relate specifically to Amber Wright.  
7 McPherson Decl. ¶ 19. These two documents were never provided as part of the DSHS public  
8 records response, and they were only provided to Plaintiff in response to discovery requests  
9 seeking these records in her torts lawsuit in federal court. *See* McPherson Decl. ¶¶ 14-17; Trial  
10 Exhibits 5 and 6. Plaintiff's petition tries to couch this as an "obstruction of justice," but her  
11 petition remarkably fails to quote any language in her lengthy 2008 request that even identifies  
12 these documents as being requested.

13 DSHS currently employs approximately 16,000 staff, serves over two million clients in  
14 need annually, and can receive over 24,000 separate records requests per year. Wiitala  
15 Declaration in Response to Petition (Wiitala Decl.) ¶ 3, 4. DSHS has experienced staff  
16 involved in public records disclosure throughout the agency and, despite the pressures of  
17 workload and the large number of requests, DSHS public records staff are dedicated  
18 professionals who are committed to the principles of open government and work hard to ensure  
19 available records are located and disclosed. Wiitala Decl. ¶ 13.

20 DSHS public records staff understand that clients have a right to their own records and  
21 they strive to do their best to produce records to the best of their abilities. Wiitala Decl. ¶ 13.  
22 Although an occasional error can occur, primarily due to overwhelming workload and time  
23 constraints, the DSHS Public Records Officer, in her ten and a half years in that role, is not  
24 aware of any employee involved in disclosing records who has deliberately or willfully failed  
25 to produce records. Wiitala Decl. ¶ 14.

1 Although more than 24,000 requests for records can be received in a year, DSHS has  
2 experienced only an average of seven public record lawsuits per year from 2006 through 2010,  
3 and only a few of these roughly 35 lawsuits have resulted in a judicial determination of  
4 penalties and attorney fees. Wiitala Decl. ¶ 15. Excluding the accepted offer of judgment in  
5 the *Tamas* case that Plaintiff has repeatedly asked this Court to give weight to, the average  
6 settlement or judgment has been about \$12,000. Wiitala Decl. ¶ 15.

7 The very strong record of good faith conduct in this case and across the DSHS public  
8 records program merits a very low penalty.

9 Training and Supervision of Employees: DSHS has a history of very strong public  
10 records training and supervision, which is discussed in detail in the attached Declaration of  
11 Kristal Wiitala, who is the DSHS Public Records Officer and is one of the top public record  
12 experts in the this state. See Wiitala Decl. ¶¶ 6-13, 16. Plaintiff's first request was March 26,  
13 2007, and as of July 2007, 95 percent of all DSHS staff, or 17,916 employees, had received  
14 public records training, and Children's Administration last reported that 93 percent of its  
15 employees had received basic public records training. Wiitala Decl. ¶ 6.

16 Under DSHS policy, each local office, facility, or region designate public disclosure  
17 officers, currently about 200 people, and each administration and division appoints a Public  
18 Disclosure Coordinator to serve as the lead expert for that area to assure that public records  
19 requests are properly routed and fulfilled in the field. Wiitala Decl. ¶ 7. All of these staff  
20 receive several types of advanced public records training. Wiitala Decl. ¶ 7. New Public  
21 Disclosure Coordinators receive training on how to route, coordinate, and manage records  
22 requests within the DSHS structure, to work with Public Disclosure Officers serving in their  
23 local offices or regions, and to be available to answer questions by staff having to search for or  
24 produce records. Wiitala Decl. ¶ 7.

25 The DSHS Public Records Officer convenes a meeting at least every other month with  
26 the approximately 30 Public Disclosure Coordinators where they discuss new court decisions

1 or legislative changes, emergent issues, procedures, and best practices. Wiitala Decl. ¶ 10.  
2 When the State Auditor's Office completed its Public Records Performance Audit in 2008,  
3 DSHS was recognized as a top performer in the various criteria reviewed in the Audit and  
4 already had in place most of the best practices recognized in that program review.  
5 Wiitala Decl. ¶ 16.

6 Therefore, the agency is well-trained and supervised on public records, which favors  
7 significant mitigation of the penalty.

8 Routing and Tracking of Requests and Documents: At the time of Plaintiff's requests,  
9 Children's Administration had a record request tracking process that utilized spreadsheets to  
10 track requests. See Wiitala Decl. ¶ 11. DSHS consistently has projects devoted to reviewing  
11 records disclosure processes and recommending continuing improvements, best practices, and  
12 enhancements. Wiitala Decl. ¶ 11. A recent project led to the adoption in 2010 of an agency-  
13 wide tracking system that is now used to coordinate, assign, track, and monitor records  
14 requests across all of DSHS. Wiitala Decl. ¶ 11. Thus, DSHS' system for routing and tracking  
15 of requests is yet another mitigating factor that should favor low penalties in this case.

16 Reasonable explanation for noncompliance: As detailed above, the explanations by  
17 DSHS are reasonable and reflect no bad faith. The audio recording was the only record missed  
18 in Plaintiff's seven volume 3,400 page child welfare file, its existence was disclosed, and the  
19 recording was provided promptly upon discovering the mistake. Recorded interviews are often  
20 transcribed, and DSHS believes the person copying the file may have thought a paper  
21 transcript of the audio recording was among the 3,400 pages of records initially provided.  
22 McPherson Decl. ¶ 9. The other two documents were provided in discovery in the torts case  
23 and were simply never identified by DSHS as documents requested by Plaintiff in her requests.  
24 The Department's reasonable explanations for not initially providing these three documents  
25 should mitigate the penalty.  
26

1        Potential for public harm or individual economic loss: Ms. Wright has not alleged any  
2 public harm or economic loss related to the disclosure of these three records. She is seeking a  
3 large sum of money in her tort lawsuit against DSHS, but that trial is not scheduled to start  
4 until May 29, 2012. *See Wright v. Dep't of Social and Health Servs.*, Pierce County Superior  
5 Court No. 09-2-06018-1. Thus, she has possessed these three records more than two years in  
6 advance of her torts trial. This should also mitigate and favor a very low daily penalty.

7        Size of the agency and deterrence of future misconduct: It is important to recognize  
8 that the large size of DSHS does not translate into a cushion in its budget to pay a large  
9 penalty. The DSHS budget is committed for client services, benefits, and other mandated  
10 functions DSHS performs, and any award of any amount adversely affects these programs.  
11 Wiitala Decl. ¶ 5.

12        DSHS' budget has been under continuing pressures to reduce expenditures and staff  
13 because of state revenue reductions, budget cuts, and caseload increases, resulting in  
14 continuing cuts in number of employees, programs, services and resources. Wiitala Decl. ¶ 5.  
15 An upcoming legislative special session will certainly reduce DSHS funding even further so  
16 that the State of Washington can resolve an estimated two billion dollar biennium shortfall, and  
17 agencies have recently been warned to prepare for up to ten percent cuts in funding.  
18 Wiitala Decl. ¶ 5.

19        There are no budget dollars set aside in DSHS to pay public records penalties, and  
20 when a public records judgment is entered against the Children's Administration, the judgment  
21 is paid directly out of the program's operating budget, thus further reducing the ability of  
22 programs to serve their clients. Wiitala Decl. ¶ 5. When lawsuits arise, DSHS takes them very  
23 seriously and reviews the systems and procedures in place to mitigate any future similar errors  
24 or risks. Wiitala Decl. ¶ 14. Thus, a large penalty is not necessary or appropriate to deter  
25 future errors.  
26

1 Plaintiff's petition failed to point to any specific facts to support a high penalty.  
2 Plaintiff simply alleges the "violations of law were egregious," but she falls short on pointing  
3 to any evidence that the records were withheld intentionally or in bad faith. Pls. Pet. at 8.  
4 Plaintiff's also purposely avoids informing this Court where the penalty ranges have been in  
5 other cases because those cases favor a low penalty in this case.

6 "In determining an appropriate penalty, [courts] look to previous awards for  
7 guidance[.]" *American Civil Liberties Union of Washington v. Blaine Sch. Dist. No. 503*, 95  
8 Wn. App. 106, 114, 975 P.2d 536 (1999) (*ACLU*). In *ACLU*, the appellate court determined  
9 that a school district acted in bad faith because they sent thousands of pages instead of the  
10 thirteen pages requested, they denied records because they did not want to take additional staff  
11 time to make copies, and they did not want to spend time assisting the ACLU with trial  
12 preparation. See *ACLU*, 95 Wn. App. at 113. With such a clear finding of bad faith, the *Blaine*  
13 court concluded that a penalty of more than \$5 per day was necessary, and \$10 per day for 577  
14 days was an appropriate penalty. See *id.* at 114. A low penalty is appropriate for good faith  
15 errors that occur:

16 The minimum statutory penalty should be reserved for instances of less egregious  
17 agency conduct, such as those instances in which the **agency has acted in good**  
18 **faith but, through an understandable** misinterpretation of the PDA or **failure**  
**to locate records**, has failed to respond adequately.

19 *Yousoufian v. Office of Ron Sims*, 114 Wn. App. 836, 854, 60 P.3d 667 (2003), *Aff'd in part*,  
20 *Rev'd in part on other grounds*, 152 Wn.2d 421, 98 P.3d 463 (2004) (emphasis added).  
21 *Yousoufian* involved the trial court concluding that "the County was negligent in the way it  
22 responded to Mr. Yousoufian's [PRA] request at every step of the way, and this negligence  
23 amounted to a lack of good faith." *Yousoufian*, 168 Wn.2d at 456. Our supreme court  
24 ultimately applied the sixteen factors and set the penalty at \$45 per day. *Id.* at 469.

25 In a more recent case with facts closer to the present case, the Washington Supreme  
26 Court approved an \$8 per day per record category penalty against an agency for wrongful

1 withholding, which consisted of a \$5 per diem penalty for the wrongful withholding itself, plus  
2 a \$3 per diem aggravator for failure to provide a brief explanation of its claimed exemptions.  
3 *Sanders*, 169 Wn.2d at 859.

4 Our present case involves facts nowhere near the negligent conduct that led to a \$45 per  
5 day penalty in *Yousoufian*, and is instead similar to the facts leading to an \$8 penalty in  
6 *Sanders*. Plaintiff did not present any evidence that the "withholding" of the three documents  
7 was intentional, and her petition points to no such evidence. We respectfully ask this Court to  
8 impose penalties in the zero to \$15 per day range.

9 **5. Even If Plaintiff Is Entitled To A Daily Penalty For The Audio Recording,**  
10 **She Is Not Entitled To An Increase In Penalties For The Transcription Of**  
11 **The Audio Recording That Was Created More Than A Year After Her**  
**Public Record Requests Were Made**

12 It is undisputed that the audio recording was transcribed in December 2009, when the  
13 Department discovered the recording was not previously provided to Plaintiff. McPherson  
14 Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. D. Thus, the transcription itself is not a separate responsive record that was  
15 withheld.

16 When the Department transcribed the audio recording in December 2009 and provided  
17 the transcription along with a copy of the audio recording, the transcription was provided as a  
18 courtesy, not as a requirement under the PRA. Plaintiff is not entitled to a separate daily  
19 penalty for the written transcription of the interview, which did not even exist at the time of her  
20 2007 or 2008 requests. The PRA does not require an agency to create a record that does not  
21 exist at the time of the request. *See Citizens For Fair Share v. State Dep't of Corrs.* 117 Wn.  
22 App. 411, 435, 72 P.3d 206 (2003), review denied, 150 Wn.2d 1037 (2004) ("the law does not  
23 require creation of non-existent records in response to a public records disclosure request").

24 Therefore, Plaintiff's request for any additional daily penalties related to the written  
25 transcript should be denied, and only the audio record can be considered for a daily penalty.  
26



1           **6. Plaintiff Is Not Entitled To Any Increase In Penalties Related To DSHS**  
2           **Failing To Provide A Privilege Log Listing The Three "Withheld"**  
3           **Documents**

4           No decision has ever held that a document that is inadvertently missed in a record  
5           production or a document that was not identified as being responsive must be put on an  
6           exemption log. In a public records request like Plaintiff's, DSHS does not list these three records  
7           on an exemption log. McPherson Decl. ¶ 22. Exemption logs are utilized to inform the requester  
8           of responsive documents that are not being provided because they are exempt from disclosure.  
9           McPherson Decl. ¶ 22. Amber Wright's recorded interview was not exempt from disclosure.  
10          McPherson Decl. ¶ 22. Rather, it was inadvertently missed in the production of documents, and it  
11          was provided without redaction upon discovering the mistake. McPherson Decl. ¶ 22. DSHS  
12          never identified the audio recording as being exempt from disclosure. McPherson Decl. ¶ 22.  
13          The Investigation Protocols document and PRIDE manual were never identified as responsive  
14          documents. McPherson Decl. ¶ 22. If they had been identified as responsive, they would have  
15          been disclosed as non-exempt instead of being listed on an exemption log. McPherson Decl. ¶ 22.

16          Although it would be an absurd result, even if such records did need to be on an  
17          exemption log, the violation should only aggravate the penalty by \$3 per day. *Sanders*,  
18          169 Wn.2d at 860-861.

19           **B. Plaintiff's Request for Attorney Fees and Costs Should be Denied Because**  
20           **Plaintiff Failed to Provide Adequate Information for This Court to Use the**  
21           **Lodestar Method to Make an Independent Determination of Attorney Fees and**  
22           **Costs**

23           **1. Plaintiff's Claimed Attorney Fees Are Excessive And Lack Sufficient Detail**  
24           **For An Independent Lodestar Determination By This Court**

25          Plaintiff has submitted a request for 426.85 hours of legal time for a team of four  
26          lawyers charging up to \$500 per hour and a list of lump-sum costs totaling \$16,096.87. The  
27          complete lack of detail and support for these charges make it impossible for this Court to  
28          conduct a Lodestar analysis.

1 In a PRA case, the trial court must make an independent determination of a reasonable  
2 fee, and the determination of a reasonable fee begins with the calculation of a Lodestar figure.  
3 *ACLU*, 95 Wn. App. at 117 (citing *Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co.*, 100 Wn.2d 581,  
4 597, 675 P.2d 193 (1983)). See also *Sanders*, 169 Wn.2d at 869 (Lodestar method is  
5 appropriate for calculating attorney fees under the PRA). A Lodestar figure is determined as  
6 follows:

7 The trial court must determine the number of hours reasonably expended in the  
8 litigation. ... The court must limit the lodestar to hours reasonably expended, and  
9 should therefore discount hours spent on unsuccessful claims, duplicated effort, or  
10 otherwise unproductive time. (citation omitted) A trial court may reduce the  
11 requested fee if it finds that the hours billed are excessive or unnecessary.

12 *ACLU*, 95 Wn. App. at 118 (emphasis added). See also *Yousoufian*, 114 Wn. App. at 856  
13 (Lodestar determination requires determining hours reasonably expended on "the litigation"  
14 and discounting unsuccessful claims and unproductive time). In *ACLU*, this state's Supreme  
15 Court affirmed that \$5,500.00 was a reasonable attorney fee for the plaintiff's attorney taking  
16 the public records case through a trial. See *ACLU*, 95 Wn. App. at 120. A court using the  
17 Lodestar method multiplies a reasonable attorney rate for the prevailing party by a reasonable  
18 number of hours worked. *Sanders*, 169 Wn.2d at 869.

19 The party seeking attorneys' fees bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of the  
20 fees. *Mahler v. Szucs*, 135 Wn.2d 398, 433-34, 957 P.2d 632 (1998). To arrive at the Lodestar  
21 elements of reasonable hours and reasonable rate, the trial court must evaluate the appropriate  
22 factors in the context of each case. *Boeing v. Sierracin Corp.*, 108 Wn.2d 38, 65, 738 P.2d 665  
23 (1987). A court should consider attorney billing information, but those figures alone are not  
24 determinative of a reasonable number of hours or reasonable rate in a particular case. *Bowers*,  
25 100 Wn.2d at 597; *Nordstrom, Inc. v. Tampourlos*, 107 Wn.2d 735, 744, 733 P.2d 208 (1987).  
26 In this case, Plaintiff has failed to provide billing information other than the claimed grand  
total for each of the four Plaintiff attorneys.

1 The reasonableness of the fees must be determined independently by the court, and the  
2 court should take an active role in analyzing attorney fee awards. *Absher Constr. Co. v. Kent*  
3 *Sch. Dist.*, 79 Wn. App. 841, 846, 917 P.2d 1086 (1995), *citing Nordstrom*, 107 Wn.2d at 744.  
4 When Courts take an active role in analyzing attorney fee awards, attorney fee affidavits  
5 submitted by counsel should not be accepted unquestionably. *See Mahler*, 135 Wn.2d at 434,  
6 *citing Nordstrom*, 107 Wn.2d at 744.

7 The trial court may supplement its Lodestar determination using the factors listed in  
8 former RPC 1.5(a), and one such factor is "[t]he fee customarily charged in the locality for  
9 similar legal services." *See Mahler*, 135 Wn.2d at 433 n.20. Plaintiff presents no evidence that  
10 the prevailing market rate in the Puget Sound region for legal services for a PRA case is \$500 per  
11 hour. This Court should follow the decision by Division One of the Court of Appeals of  
12 Washington, which held that \$300 per hour was an unreasonable hourly fee for a lawsuit brought  
13 under the Public Records Act, RCW 42.56.001, *et. seq.*, even when the plaintiff was represented  
14 by former Washington State Supreme Court Justice Philip Talmadge. *West v. Port of Olympia*,  
15 146 Wn. App. 108, 123, 192 P.3d 926 (2008). The court stated, "[a]lthough Philip Talmadge can  
16 bill \$300 per hour for work that requires his special expertise, that rate is unreasonable in a case of  
17 this type," instead, establishing that \$250 per hour was the reasonable hourly rate for services  
18 provided in that case. *Id.*

19 In addition, DSHS recently received a motion for attorney fees and costs in another  
20 public records lawsuit, *Witt v. DSHS*, and the attorney in that case with over twenty years of  
21 experience, including appellate practice<sup>2</sup> on public records issues, is charging an hourly rate of  
22 \$250 per hour. Wiitala Decl. ¶17, Ex. A. By way of comparison, that case has involved more  
23 than three years of litigation, discovery, hearings on four motions, mediation, and a one day  
24 trial with live witnesses. Wiitala Decl. ¶17. The attached motion and supporting attorney fee

25 <sup>2</sup> The attorney in *Witt v. DSHS* was the attorney of record in the case *In re Dependency of KB*,  
26 150 Wn. App. 912, 210 P.3d 330 (2009), which was one of the central PRA reported decisions argued throughout  
this present case.

1 summary filed in that case seeks a total of \$15,821.25 in fees and costs. Wiitala Decl. ¶17,  
2 Ex. A. That case was more complex than the present case and included issues with injunctions  
3 and hundreds of pages of contested redactions. Wiitala Decl. ¶17.

4 The attorney fee applied in this present case should be \$250 per hour, which is in  
5 perfect agreement with *West v. Port of Olympia*, and the *Witt v. DSHS* case that is more  
6 complex than this case. The issues in this case were not particularly complex. Plaintiff had  
7 one witness and eleven exhibits at trial, and the trial issues did not merit the filing of a trial  
8 brief or motion in limine from Plaintiff. There was a summary judgment hearing on April 29,  
9 2011, and a day and a half trial that started on August 31, 2011.

10 To determine the number of hours reasonably spent in litigation, the court may rely upon  
11 the attorney's documentation of the work performed. *Bowers*, 100 Wn.2d at 597. Plaintiff has  
12 failed to provide the following documentation required by the *Bowers* case:

13 To this end, the attorneys must provide reasonable documentation of the work  
14 performed. This documentation need not be exhaustive or in minute detail, but  
15 must inform the court, in addition to the number of hours worked, of the type of  
16 work performed and the category of attorney who performed the work ( *i.e.*,  
senior partner, associate, etc.).

17 *Id.* When such documentation is provided, the court has an independent obligation to look  
18 beyond the hours the attorney spent or could bill the client. *Nordstrom*, 107 Wn.2d at 744. In  
19 other words, the amount of time "actually spent by the plaintiff's attorney may be relevant but it is  
20 in no way dispositive." *Id.* Hours that are not reasonably expended are not compensable.  
21 *Hensley v. Eckerhart*, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983). Unreasonable hours include  
22 those spent on duplicated effort, unnecessary preparation or otherwise unproductive time.  
23 *Mahler*, 135 Wn.2d at 434; *Bowers* 100 Wn.2d at 597, 600.

24 Plaintiff has failed her burden to prove that the 426.85 hours of legal time spent were  
25 reasonably spent on this litigation. Plaintiff also has failed to justify why a team of four lawyers  
26 was needed for this case. A Trial Court should look hard at situations where multiple attorneys

1 are engaged in essentially the same task.

2 While certain complex litigation may require the combined effort by counsel, this  
3 factually limited excessive force case, with well-established legal standards, is not  
4 one which requires joint effort of specific tasks. The court's criticism in this respect  
5 is not directed to the use of two attorneys to litigate the matter. Having made that  
6 decision, however, counsel are not free to charge twice for essentially the same work  
7 performed outside the hearing and trial context....These records reflect that counsel  
8 undertook to bill twice for essentially the same task, one direct (the actual research,  
9 drafting, or preparation) and one indirect (telling co-counsel or 'discussing' what  
10 one has learned or done.) This practice is reflective of the unreasonableness of  
11 counsel's fee request.

12 *Heavener v. Myers*, 158 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1282 (E.D. OK 2001). See also *Forshee v. Waterloo*  
13 *Indus., Inc.* 178 F.3d 527, 532 (8th Cir. 1999) (court reasonably reduced hours claimed for  
14 duplicative efforts). It is also appropriate for a court to apply a percentage reduction to fees in  
15 a PRA case based on "overall excessiveness of the amount of fees expended, and the fact that  
16 the majority of the fees were incurred after the disclosure had been made." See *Yousoufian*,  
17 114 Wn. App. at 856-57, *aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds*, 152 Wn.2d 421 (2004).  
18 Here, all the fees in this litigation were incurred after disclosure of the three documents in  
19 question.

20 A court has the discretion to apportion an award of costs and fees so that it does not  
21 relate to any exempt documents. See *Limstrom v. Ladenburg*, 136 Wn.2d 595, 616, 963 P.2d  
22 869 (1998) (requiring that an award "relate only to that which is disclosed and not to any  
23 portion of the requested documents found to be exempt"). In the present case, the three records  
24 at issue did not reasonably require over 400 hours or legal time to determine whether there was  
25 a PRA violation related to those records. The Department never disputed when each of the  
26 three records were provided to Plaintiff's counsel. The Department never disputed that the  
recorded interview was a responsive record; the dispute was whether the recorded interview  
was governed by RCW 13.50.100 or the PRA. With regard to the other two documents, there  
was no dispute that they were provided to Plaintiff through discovery responses in her torts

1 litigation. Rather, the dispute on those two documents was whether or not they were actually  
2 requested and identified in Plaintiff's public record requests.

3 Other than the trial, very little time in this case was actually spent focusing on the three  
4 documents that this Court determined were improperly withheld. Defendant has no idea how  
5 Plaintiff can attribute 426.85 hours of legal work to prevailing on those three documents.  
6 Thus, Defendant cannot make an informed and meaningful recommendation for a reduction  
7 without seeing what the hundreds of hours are claimed are actually comprised of.

8 This Court should deny Plaintiff's request for attorney fees. If the Court is going to  
9 award fees, it should award a fee of \$25,000. Such fee is comprised of a reasonable estimate  
10 of 100 hours of work for one attorney at \$250 per hour.

11 **2. Plaintiff's Request For A 2.0 Lodestar Multiplier Should Be Denied**

12 With over thirty years of reported public record decisions, we are not aware of any  
13 PRA lawsuit or decision that has ever approved a Lodestar multiplier for an attorney fee award,  
14 and Plaintiff provides no such authority. The primary case relied on by Plaintiff for a  
15 contingency fee Lodestar multiplier is *Hudson Co., Inc. v. Ryffel* 2009 WL 2601983 (Wn. App.  
16 Div. 2, 2009). *Hudson* is an unpublished decision, has no precedential value, and cannot be  
17 cited as authority by Plaintiff. *See* GR 14.1; RCW 2.06.040.

18 In rare cases, a Lodestar fee calculation can be adjusted upward or downward. *Mahler*,  
19 135 Wn.2d at 434. However, such adjustments are indeed "rare." *See Sanders*, 169 Wn.2d at  
20 869. In *Sanders*, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant  
21 Justice Sanders his requested 1.5 Lodestar multiplier in a PRA case. *Id.* "It was not an abuse  
22 of discretion for the trial court to refuse to give Justice Sanders the benefit of the exception  
23 when the rate times hours product already greatly exceeded the contingency fee for the case."  
24 *Id.*

25 The exact same situation applies in this case. Plaintiff is seeking an inflated penalty  
26 calculation of \$287,800. Plaintiff does not provide evidence of what her contingency fee is.

1 However, her request for attorney fees of \$332,500 would be a contingency fee of 115 per cent,  
2 which is the epitome of an unreasonable attorney fee.

3 Plaintiff tries to describe this as a high risk case. Yet, it is a fact that she had already  
4 received the three documents found to be withheld before she filed this lawsuit. Also, the case  
5 is not significantly risky when the PRA has a powerful strict liability penalty and attorney fee  
6 provision under RCW 42.56.550(4) that allows for a recovery of reasonable attorney fees. A  
7 multiplier is inappropriate in this case and will invite increased public records litigation from  
8 attorneys hoping to have a chance at Plaintiff's requested \$1,000 per hour for legal fees.  
9 Plaintiff's request for a Lodestar multiplier should be denied.

10 **3. Plaintiff's Undocumented Litigation Costs Are Excessive And Lack**  
11 **Sufficient Detail For An Independent Lodestar Analysis By This Court**

12 Plaintiff has made an inadequate showing to support her requested \$16,096.87 in costs,  
13 and DSHS disputes the following costs:

14	Court Reporter	\$1,400.00
15	Depositions	\$1,906.18
16	Outside Photocopies	\$2,735.39
	Expert Fees	\$6,360.00
	In-House Print Jobs	\$1,203.50

17 For all five of these categories, Plaintiff has failed to itemize any of these totals, much  
18 less show how they were reasonably necessary for this litigation. The depositions involved  
19 very minimal discussion about the three documents that were determined to be improperly  
20 withheld. Plaintiff did not use the depositions at trial. The photocopy charges, both inside and  
21 outside, are excessive and unsupported. Plaintiff only had eleven small exhibits at trial. These  
22 costs should be reduced by at least 50 per cent.

23 Plaintiff's request for \$6,360.00 in expert fees should be denied. An expert's opinion is  
24 admissible if the witness is properly qualified, relies on generally accepted theories, and the  
25 expert's testimony is helpful to the trier of fact, construing "helpfulness" broadly.  
26 *Philippides v. Bernard*, 151 Wn.2d 376, 88 P.3d 939 (2004). Generally, expert evidence is

1 helpful and appropriate when the testimony concerns matters beyond the common knowledge  
2 of the average layperson. *Carlton v. Vancouver Care, LLC*, 155 Wn. App. 151, 231 P.3d 1241  
3 (2010). The testimony of Plaintiff's alleged expert was not qualified by the court, was lay  
4 testimony rather than expert opinion, and cannot fairly be characterized as "expert" testimony.  
5 Expert fees are not warranted when the testimony provided is actually lay testimony.


6 Also, costs have generally been narrowly defined and absent specific statutory  
7 authority, expert witness fees are not recoverable as costs. *Hayes v. City of Seattle*, 131 Wn.2d  
8 706, 718, 934 P.2d 1179 (1997). The *Hayes* court held that "[a]lthough RCW 64.40.020 does  
9 provide for an award of reasonable attorney fees in addition to costs, it does not explicitly  
10 provide for recovery of expert witness fees and we are not inclined to place fees for experts  
11 under the umbrella of attorney fees." *Id.* at 718-19. Accordingly, the court should deny  
12 Plaintiff's undocumented request for expert fees.

#### 13 V. CONCLUSION

14 Public record penalties and fees will be paid out the program funds in Children's  
15 Administration that are targeted for assisting children. This Court should deny Plaintiff's  
16 request to be awarded the highest possible penalty scheme conceivable. Instead, this Court  
17 should award a daily penalty of zero to \$15 dollars per day for two "records" as summarized in  
18 Appendix A to this Response. Also, Plaintiff's request for attorney fees and costs should be  
19 denied because Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient information to allow an independent  
20 lodestar determination by the Court.

21 DATED this 7<sup>th</sup> day of November, 2011.

22 ROBERT M. MCKENNA  
23 Attorney General

24   
25 JOHN D. CLARK, WSBA #28537  
26 Assistant Attorney General  
Attorneys for Defendant



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I served a copy of the DEPT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR STATUTORY PENALTIES, ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS, Declaration of Kristal Wiitala, and Declaration of Barbara McPherson with exhibits, on all parties or their counsel of record on the date below as follows:

David P. Moody  
Martin D. McLean  
Hagens, Berman, Sobol, Shapiro LLP  
1918 8<sup>th</sup> Avenue, Suite 3300  
Seattle WA 98101

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I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct.

DATED this 7 day of November 2011 at Tumwater, Washington.

Beverly Cox  
BEVERLY COX, Legal Assistant